An Important Mathematical Oversight

The original intention for this website was to encourage public awareness of an historical medical crime, one that has remained a tightly-kept British state secret now for more than five decades. The matter is of enormous public interest, not least because the motivation behind the crime itself was that of advancing scientific research into areas that would come to provide the seminal knowledge behind much of the technological progress of the last half-century. My investigation into the matter inspired a parallel enquiry into some of the fundamental principles that underpin that scientific and technological impulse.

There are therefore two principle concerns of this website, and if there is acknowledged to be a substantive connection between them, that has inevitably to do with late 20th Century developments in science and information technologies, and more broadly with the idea of an burgeoning technocracy – the suggestion of a growing alliance between corporate technology and state power – one which might be judged to have atrophied the powers conventionally assigned to liberal-democratic institutions. This link therefore serves as a segue to emphasise the equal importance, to my mind, of what is going on in the X.cetera section of the site, so that that section should not appear, from the point of view of the other, as some kind of 'afterthought'.

X.cetera is concerned with a problem in mathematics and science to do with the way we think about numbers. As a subset of the category defined as integers, elements in the series of the natural numbers are generally held to represent quantities as their absolute, or 'integral', properties. On the page: The Limits of Rationality I have made a criticism of this standard definition of integers as indices of self-contained values, on the basis that the definition obscures the fact that the relations of proportion between integers is derived from their membership of a restrictive group of characters as defined by the decimal rational schema; and that those ratios of proportion cannot be assumed to apply to the the same values when transcribed into alternative radical bases such as binary, or octal, or hexadecimal, for instance.

This means that, while the values of individual integers so transcribed will be ostensibly equal across those alternative radices, the ratios of proportion between groups of those values will not be preserved, as these must be determined uniquely according to the range of available digits within any respective radix (0-9 in decimal, 0-7 in octal, for instance); one consequence of which of course is the variable relative frequency (or 'potentiality') of specific individual digits when compared across radices. This observation has serious consequences in terms of its implications for the logical consistency of data produced within digital information systems, as the logic of those systems generally relies upon the seamless correspondence, not only of 'integral' values when transcribed between decimal and the aforementioned radices, but ultimately upon the relations of proportion between those values.

Information Science tends to treat the translation and recording of conventional analogue information into digital format unproblematically. The digital encoding of written, spoken, or visual information is seen to have little effect on the representational content of the message. The process is taken to be neutral, faithful, transparent. The assessment of quantitative and qualitative differences at the level of the observable world retains its accuracy despite at some stage involving a reduction, at the level of machine code, to the form of a series of simple binary (or 'logical') distinctions between '1' and '0' – positive and negative. This idea relies upon a tacit assumption that there exists such a level of fine-grained logical simplicity as the basis of a hierarchy of logical relationships, and which transcends all systems of conventional analogue (or indeed sensory) representation (be they linguistic, visual, sonic, or whatever); and that therefore we may break down these systems of representation to this level – the digital level – and then re-assemble them, as it were, without corruption.

However, in the X.cetera section I am concerned to point out that the logical relationship between '1' and '0' in a binary system (which equates in quantitative terms with what we understand as their proportional relationship) is derived specifically from their membership of a uniquely defined group of digits (in the case of binary, limited to two members). It does not derive from a set of transcendent logical principles arising elsewhere and having universal applicability (a proposition that will come as a surprise to many mathematicians and information scientists alike).

It follows that the proportional relationships affecting quantitative expressions within binary, being uniquely and restrictively determined, cannot be assumed to apply (with proportional consistency) to translations of the same expressions into decimal (or into any other number radix, such as octal, or hexadecimal). By extension therefore, the logical relationships within a binary system of codes, being subject to the same restrictive determinations, cannot therefore be applied with logical consistency to conventional analogue representations of the observable world, as this would be to invest binary code with a transcendent logical potential that it simply cannot possess – they may be applied to such representations, and the results may appear to be internally consistent, but they will certainly not be logically consistent with the world of objects.

The issue of a failure of logical consistency is one that concerns the relationships between data objects – it does not concern the specific accuracy or internal content of data objects themselves (just as the variation in proportion across radices concerns the dynamic relations between integers, rather than their specific 'integral' numerical values). This means that, from a conventional scientific-positivist perspective, which generally relies for its raw data upon information derived from discrete acts of measurement, the problem will be difficult to recognise or detect (as the data might well appear to possess internal consistency). One will however experience the effects of the failure (while being rather mystified as to its causes) in the lack of a reliable correspondence between expectations derived from data analyses, and real-world events.

So that's some of what X.cetera is all about.. If you think you're 'ard enough!

A Miscarriage of Civil Justice

The reference in the title to a 'miscarriage of civil justice' concerns the conduct of a civil legal housing possession claim brought against me by my landlord, following the landlord's realisation (beginning in 2014) that I was no longer occupying my flat on a day-to-day basis, contrary to the terms of my tenancy agreement (which stated that I must occupy the flat as my principle residence for at least six months in any year). As a reminder, I had been compelled to avoid daily occupancy of my flat following a serious attempt on my life there on 17/02/2014, when I had been exposed to the presence of an unknown lethal toxic substance understood to have been introduced to the property through a small gap between the base of the front door and the hall floor (re: Attempts on My life, or pp.88-89 of my report).

In spite of the fact that following my departure from the flat I had tried to alert the landlord, through its agent CDS, of the reasons for my apparent non-occupancy, and of a serious risk to life at the flat due to the presence within it of a lethal toxic substance, the agent was unreceptive to these reports and responded to my perceived breach of tenancy agreement by issuing a Notice to Quit during February 2015.1 For various reasons this Notice was not acted upon and I managed to retain the tenancy and continued to pay the rent there. However, I had no success in persuading the police of the presence of a lethal toxic hazard at the flat, as the police were equally as unreceptive to my reports as either of the landlord's agents had been (re: Attempts on My life, or pp.89-91 of my report). My non-occupancy of the flat necessarily continued therefore, as I had no desire to become exposed a second time to the hazard I knew to exist within the flat, and to which I had been minimally exposed in February 2014, causing me to be ill for several weeks. This problem also inhibited any intention I may have had of trying to safely remove my belongings from the flat. In addition to that, there was some evidence of illegal entries to the flat during my absence between February 2014 and March 2015, and which had clearly not been for the purpose of removing anything from the flat. The police were similarly unreceptive to my reports to them during March 2015 of those illegal entries, and therefore maintaining my absence from the flat continued to be the only means for me to ensure avoidance of both known as well as unknown potential risks to my life within the flat.

I made further attempts during 2015 and 2016 to impress upon the landlord and its new agent MBM the very real circumstances that were preventing my occupation, and the reality that, so long as the relevant authorities would refuse to respond to reports of those circumstances with the appropriate concern, then I was powerless by myself to resolve the situation. MBM's response was eventually to issue a second Notice to Quit during December 2016. This however contained an error and so it was re-issued on 22/02/2017. Thereafter, the landlord issued its first claim for possession in the Lambeth County Court dated 13/10/2017. The sole ground of this claim was that of "non-occupation", as a breach of my tenancy agreement, as there were no rent arrears at that time.

My legal defence against that claim proceeded until the date of the trial at Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court on 04/10/2018, whereupon a Possession Order was granted to the landlord. Thereafter, I was evicted from the flat on 28/01/2019, and shortly after lost possession of the entirety of the belongings I held at the flat, as I had nowhere I could store them, and was also unable to afford to pay for their storage indefinitely (moreover, I could not take responsibility for physically removing my belongings from the flat, as that process would have exposed me to a known lethal toxic hazard). My genuine defence against the possession claim had not been heard in court however, and I spent the next two years – until December 2020 – trying to appeal the judgement of the 04/10/2018 in the London county courts. My conclusion that the conduct of my defence against the claim represents a 'miscarriage of civil justice' requires substantial support, and it would require the addition to my report of at least 100 pages of further explanation and documentary references to substantiate the claim, which I feel would be disproportionate in the context of that report.

Miscarriage_of_Justice.zip [ZIP archive – 123MB]

The conduct of the entire case however, from the initial claim in October 2017 to the final judgement made at Mayor's & City of London Court dated 01/12/2020 was represented in a series of 39 email statements, sent between October 2018 and June 2021 to the Channel4 News Team in the UK, together with documentary evidence as attachments to those emails. The combined series of emails, together with their attachments, is available to download at the link above, so that the allegations of a wilful miscarriage of civil justice on behalf of certain legal entities (including the individual parties to my defence team) and of serial violations of Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights made against certain offices of the UK Ministry of Justice, may be judged on the papers themselves.2

Motive and method of the alleged perversion of my defence case

As discussed at the page Attempts on My life, as a consequence of the series of attempts on my life experienced since I came into possession of the first MRI scan evidence in December 2010, I had retained within my flat a collection of items suspected to contain various kinds of toxin. During a planned redecoration of the flat, the bedroom was being used temporarily as a spare-room, and within it I kept a large holdall containing numerous items routinely purchased by myself which were suspected to contain various lethal toxins, including certain items suspected to contain neurotoxins and radio-toxins (e.g., a bottle of water which was suspected to contain radioactive polonium210 ). I understand therefore that my discussion of the existence of this evidence within my report (p.85) and on this website presented a significant risk of ongoing liability to those organisations potentially implicated by that evidence, or by my associated allegations against the government and health service in the UK (since my possession of that evidence provided de facto validation of my claims of being the victim of an historical medical atrocity).

Frequently within other pages in this section, I have described how it has been a typical response from clinicians in all the areas of health service practice I have had cause to make use of in recent years, but particularly within those departments that I have alleged have covered-up the evidence of my two brain MRI scans, to treat my suspicions regarding the purpose and intent of my tonsillectomy at age five as the products of a 'delusional psychosis', as a means of distancing current clinical practice, as well as the reputation of the NHS as a whole, from the effects of a seriously damning controversy. I am not so naïve not to have anticipated this as the most likely response on behalf of those clinicians – because the responsibility involved in voicing objective assent to the possible truth-value behind those historical allegations was simply too great for any individual clinician to assume. The false assertion that the allegations were the products of a mental pathology would always suggest itself as a convenient prophylaxis by which clinicians might defer that individual responsibility – it mattered little therefore that the allegations themselves had arisen only as a careful and reasoned response to substantive medical evidence. What is important to emphasise at this point is that this same assertion of a mental pathology had likewise been typically exploited by the police as their justification for disregarding and dismissing evidence presented to them of the attempts on my life – attempts which, ironically, had been provoked as an organised clandestine response to the very real threat of a public disclosure of the substance behind my historical allegations. This symmetrical response shared between police and clinicians meant therefore that I had no effective protection either from the law or from health services against those ongoing attempts on my life.

It is important to take note therefore that in the conduct of the housing possession case against me the parties to my defence against the possession claim themselves similarly adopted, from the very beginning of my defence case, this identical set of false assertions regarding my mental health, and that those assertions were then employed, with the aid of an inexpert opinion on my mental capacity provided by my doctor, to deny me the legal capacity with which to give any instructions to my defence against the claim. I was effectively 'gagged', for the duration of the case, from making any statement in court about the very real series of attempts on my life which were nevertheless the only genuinely appreciable grounds for my not having occupied the flat since February 2014.

In UK law, when a defendant has been assessed as lacking legal capacity, a "Litigation Friend" must be appointed to give instructions to his defence. This resulted in the Office of the Official Solicitor (a department of the Ministry of Justice) being appointed as my "litigation friend" in the proceedings, which meant that my defence was thereafter under the control of an office of government, i.e., regardless of the inevitable conflict of interests this would entail (given the context of my serious allegations against other offices of that Government). An expert opinion upon my legal capacity, which eventually restored legal capacity to me in May 2019, was not sought by my defence team (i.e., on the instruction of the Official Solicitor) until after the termination of the legal process which resulted in my eviction from my flat on 28/01/2019 and the irretrievable disposal of the entire contents of my flat (including the evidence of organised attempts on my life) by agents of the landlord on 04/02/2019. It is alleged therefore that the entire conduct of my defence, comprising three distinct legal entities (including the Official Solicitor), was one organised in bad faith and intentionally against my own interests; and was in fact motivated chiefly in the interest of 'cleansing' the evidence of organised attempts on my life from the flat.

The conduct of my legal team in defence against the claim

The issue is detailed and complex – an outline of the problems in the case is presented in my first email to Channel4 News of 19/10/2018 (item 01 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf in the download of documents); but essentially the case I have made in that series of emails is that the decision of the court on 04/10/2018 to grant possession to the claimant must be considered as the result of a miscarriage of civil justice, as it was the intended consequence of a concerted effort by the three parties to my defence team, who had contrived between them to suppress from the attention of the court any representation of the evidence in support of the genuine grounds for my non-occupation of the flat.

'Non-occupation' was the sole ground of the landlord's claim for possession. My contention is that this ground was not proven, in view of the facts that I had no other principle place of residence; that I had no choice but to not occupy the flat in order to avoid a persistent series of attempts on my life there (circumstances that were entirely beyond my control); and the fact that each of the landlord, its managing agent, and the police, had shown an absence of due concern in response to my reports to them of attempts on my life at the property.

My defence team were collectively simply averse to advancing any statement in my defence that averred even the possibility of a real existing threat to my life, electing instead for their preferred interpretation that my reports of attempts on my life were the products of a 'delusional psychosis'; and opting on that basis for a defence based solely upon mental disability criteria. This was in spite of the fact that there was a lack of available expert medical opinion to support such a defence; while there was an existing expert psychiatric opinion that had affirmed the possibility that I might have a valid reason to fear for my life (i.e., in the context of claims I made since December 2010 of being the victim of an historical medical crime).

The disability defence was one likely to fail in court, and so my allegation is that my defence team deliberately sacrificed the option of a stronger defence (in the terms described above), in order to 'throw' the chance of a successful defence against the possession claim in court; and that they acted in a concerted manner to that end, under an inducement imposed upon them externally, in the form of an organised imperative. The result was that, following the decision at court on 04/10/2018, I was evicted from my flat on 28/01/2019, rendering me immediately homeless, and thereafter I lost possession of all of the belongings I had retained there due in large part to the intractable difficulty posed by the prospect of retrieving those belongings which I knew to contain a lethal toxic hazard. The belongings were all irretrievably disposed of by contractors of the landlord on 04/02/2019, without any specific warning of that event being given me by the landlord.

The conduct of the courts during my efforts to appeal the judgement

In spite of my efforts during January 2019 to request that the court intervene to set aside the planned eviction, by making representations to the court to bring to its attention evidence of malfeasance in the conduct of my defence leading up to the trial, these arguments were disregarded by the court, and no reasonable stay or postponement of the eviction was permitted. Nevertheless, I continued during 2019-20 to pursue whatever litigation options remained available to me, the most recent being my late application for permission to appeal the court's decision of 04/10/2018 to grant possession to the landlord. This was submitted to Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court on 27/08/2019 (re: item 18 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf). The application was eventually transferred to the Central London County Court on 11/11/2019, after a delay of eleven weeks.

From their management of this case during 2019, it is reasonably clear that staff at both county courts deliberately invoked a series of procedural delays which succeeded in obstructing any reasonable efforts that I made to challenge, either the trial decision of 04/10/2018, or the implementation of that decision; or at least they have succeeded in unreasonably deferring the results of those efforts. This is most clearly exemplified by the court's conduct in response to my first application for permission to appeal the judgement of 04/10/2018, which appears to have been sequestered by clerks at the court for the period 28/08/2019 to 08/11/2019, until, that is, I submitted a complaint to the court on 07/11/2019 over the very issue. Immediately following my complaint, the court finally acknowledged the application for permission to appeal (while the court's published response window for dealing with such applications was “fifteen working days” – see items 19-21 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf).

The application for permission to appeal the possession order of 04/10/2018 was the subject of a hearing by Judge Hellman at Central London County Court on 12/03/2020, to which I attended. Permission to appeal was refused at that hearing; but, in combination with the fact that I had no access to impartial legal advice, this refusal was chiefly a consequence of further subterfuge by the clerks at the court, in disrupting the fair process of my application following the court's decision to list the hearing made on 27/11/2019. Information regarding the decision to list the hearing was arbitrarily withheld from my attention by the clerks for a period of eight weeks following that decision, meaning that the preparation of the papers in support of the appeal was delayed beyond my control until the 11/03/2020, only the day before the hearing itself. Hence, Judge Hellman had insufficient opportunity to appraise that evidence in advance of the hearing.

In the absence of legal advice, I made an ill-advised attempt to appeal Judge Hellman's decision in an application dated 06/04/2020. The appropriate response to this application by the staff at Central London County Court (according to Section 3.9 §2(a) of Practice Direction 52A of the Civil Procedure Rules)3 was to consult with a judge at that court upon the admissibility of the application, whereupon it might have been quickly established that an application to appeal specifically a decision to refuse permission made in the county court is not permissible under s.54(4) of the Access to Justice Act, 1999. The response from administrative staff at the court however, without consulting a judge at court, was to misdirect the erroneous application to the Civil Appeals Registry, which administers applications to the High Court/Court of Appeal, where it took until 18/05/2020 for the inadmissibility of the application to be determined by the Master of the Court of Appeal.

After consulting s.54(4) of the Access to Justice Act, 1999, which did not appear to prohibit a second application to appeal the original decision granting possession to the claimant made at Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court on 04/10/2018, I resolved to submit such a second application to Central London County Court on 01/06/2020. The arguments and evidence in support of this application were expanded on 12/06/2020 (the content of the latest application is contained in items 31-32 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf, together with their corresponding attachments). Following these submissions, administrative staff at Central London County Court once again failed to observe correct civil procedure by diverting the application inappropriately to the Court of Appeal, without referring that application initially to a judge at court. The Civil Appeals Registry eventually rejected the application on 09/10/2020 (as an appeal against the decision of a district judge in the county court cannot be heard in the High Court or Court of Appeal, and may only be heard in the county court itself) after itself delaying eleven weeks in referring the application to a judge. Thereafter, the application was resubmitted back to Central London County Court on 14/10/2020 (see item 35 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf). The latest application makes serious allegations of a criminal nature against the three parties to my defence team (one of those parties being an office of Government) (see in particular the attachments to email 32 in Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf).

The second application was eventually heard by Judge Hellman in chambers at Mayor's & City of London Court on 26/11/2020, where he again refused permission to appeal (without any option for an oral hearing), in an order dated 01/12/2020. Since the grounds of the second application included substantive criticism of Judge Hellman's reasoning in his decision on the first application, there are reasons to doubt the Judge's impartiality in his latest decision. The entire legal process of the possession claim and my subsequent attempts to appeal its outcome then became the subject of an application to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging against the UK serial violations of Articles 6 & 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, citing the actions of various offices of the Ministry of Justice.

There are particular concerns arising out of Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court's management of this case earlier in 2019 also (see in particular items 09-12, 15, 16, & 18 from Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf). There are specific allegations of fraud relating to the conduct of officials at the court, of the company responsible for producing court transcripts, and of a district judge at the court, in response to my application for a transcript of the hearing at court on 25/01/2019 of my application to set aside the warrant of possession (re: item 15 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf). If proven, these allegations would seriously undermine the principle of the Judiciary's independence of the Executive within the British Constitution.

Taken in its entirety, the information disclosed in the tranche of documents contained in the archive download reveals evidence of the effects of systematic corruption across the judicial system, and which has predetermined the actions, not only of the individual parties to my defence team (which included an office of the Ministry of Justice), but also those of officials at various county courts, including judges at those courts. I have argued in the various statements made in support of my applications to appeal during 2019-20, that it is only possible to comprehend a possible motivation behind such a degree of aggregated juridical malfeasance when it is viewed in the context of the enormity of my major historical claims against offices of the British Government and Health Service, and the consequent threat to national security (and in particular to the reputation of the cherished NHS) posed by the prospect of a public disclosure of the truth behind those claims. The trigger for this systematic corruption is therefore understood to have been any reference to my specific identity within the context of civil legal proceedings which presented a foreseeable risk of such a disclosure.

Applications to the European Court of Human Rights

On 23/02/2021, I submitted an application to the European Court of Human Rights ('ECtHR') alleging violations of Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights against the UK; i.e., in respect of the conduct and outcome of the housing possession case against me, and also with regard to the conduct of the courts in wilfully obstructing my attempts during 2019-20 to appeal the judgement made at Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court on 04/10/2018 which had originally granted possession of my flat to the landlord.

I received a response from ECtHR dated 18/03/2021 rejecting the application (reference: 12776/21) for the reason that I had not included within the bundle of supporting documents copies of the transcripts of the various court judgements referenced within the application. At that time I possessed only one of the missing transcripts, while ECtHR identified five such transcripts required to complete the application. I was determined to submit a complete second application, and so I then made requests to the relevant courts in London by email on 12/04/2021 for the outstanding transcripts. After having eventually received all but one of these (the court in question had responded to say that the relevant case file "cannot be located"), I then submitted a 'complete' second application to ECtHR dated 19/05/2021.

ECtHR_Applications.zip [ZIP archive – 39MB]

All of the material submitted to ECtHR in each of the two applications (with the exception of the 330-page bundle accompanying the first), including the response letter from the Court of 18/03/2021, was submitted by email to the Channel4 News Team on 15/06/2021 (re: item 38 in Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf in the archive Miscarriage_of_Justice.zip).4 The difficulties and resistance I met with from the London courts in response to my four transcript requests of 12/04/2021 is described in detail in my subsequent email to the news team of 21/06/2021 (item 39 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf). The documents involved in those requests, including correspondence with three London courts and the transcription company Marten Walsh Cherer, is included in three PDF folios as attached to that email. There are further potential allegations of fraud which may transpire from this material, with regard to the interactions between the transcription company and Central London County Court, and which echo those remarked upon earlier on this page (in reference to item 15 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf); i.e., in relation to my earlier transcript request made to Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court during May 2019. It had chiefly been my awareness of the sensitivity implied by my allegations in relation to that earlier transcript which had encouraged me to exclude it from my first application to ECtHR of 23/02/2021, in the expectation that this somewhat controversial material could ultimately be submitted to the European Court at a later date, following (so I anticipated) its initial acceptance of the first application.

ECtHR's eventual (backdated) dismissal of my second application

On 27/05/2021, I received acknowledgement from ECtHR during a telephone call that it had received the second application on 25/05/2021 and was given the reference: 26495/21. The second application had been sent from Sweden, and included the address of the hostel where I stayed in Stockholm – Interhostel – as my address for correspondence. I waited for a response from the Court, occasionally checking the progress of the application at the Court's searchable online State of Proceedings web facility ('SOP').5 The first entry to appear there in relation to the application was dated 21/06/2021, and showed the state of proceedings as: "Application awaiting first judicial decision". In comparison, the Court's response to my first 'incomplete' application had been its dismissal letter of 18/03/2021, before any information was recorded at the online database (there remains no information at the SOP facility in relation to that first application).

Following the events of 12/07/2021 at Interhostel described on the page Swedish Asylum Applications (2018-2021), I was hospitalised for a period of ten weeks, although I had limited day-to-day mobility outside the ward where I stayed. In a decision which I understand to have been largely driven by the disturbance of those events, the hostel was compelled to finally close for business on 31/08/2021. It was necessary therefore for me to inform ECtHR of a change in my correspondence address, and so on 26/08/2021 I sent a letter to the Court advising it that correspondence should now be addressed to a poste restante address in Stockholm instead of the hostel address given in my application form.

I had anticipated that the hostel premises at Kammakargatan 46 would be inaccessible following its planned closure on 31/08/2021. However, it transpired that the hostel management were to conduct a 'firesale' of the hostel's domestic equipment at the premises for the duration of September 2021, meaning that the premises remained accessible for that period and I was able to telephone the staff there to check for any mail that might arrive from ECtHR. This I continued to do, in addition to checking for mail at the poste restante address, until I finally departed Sweden on 24/09/2021. No mail was received from the Court however during that period at either of the given addresses.

From my new location (details withheld), I sent a further letter to ECtHR on 29/09/2021 to change once more my correspondence address with the Court. In that letter, I tried to emphasise to the Court the point that the UK's alleged violation of Article 8 §1 of the Convention on Human Rights, as detailed within my application, should be regarded by the Court as a "continuing situation" with respect to Article 35 §1 of the Convention; and that as such the application demanded a more urgent response from the Court than was apparent from its delay at that point of four months in arriving at its initial judicial decision (the state of proceedings at this time recorded at the SOP facility remained unchanged from that of 21/06/2021 – as: "Application awaiting first judicial decision").

After waiting a further two weeks, with no response from the Court, and no change in status of the application at the SOP facility, on 16/10/2021 I decided to publish this current web page referencing my correspondence with the Channel4 News Team on the subject this alleged miscarriage of civil justice. This included my correspondence relating to my two successive applications to ECtHR (re: item 38 of Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf), and was the occasion of the first online publication of each of the two ZIP archives containing the combined correspondence to Channel4 News [Miscarriage_of_Justice.zip – 123MB], and the two applications to ECtHR [ECtHR_Applications.zip – 39MB].

Between 19/10/2021 and 27/10/2021, I made three further updates to this website. The first of these was to include the additional page describing my asylum applications in Sweden. The fourth update, dated 27/10/2021, included some minor textual revisions to the current page and also included for the first time a link to the ECtHR's SOP online facility, together with my remark that the Court's apparent delay in providing a more effectual response to the application than the one recorded at the SOP facility was "unacceptable" in view of my allegation regarding the "continuing situation" of the UK's violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Naturally, immediately prior to making that update to the current page I had researched the link itself to check the current status of the application, which – on 27/10/2021 – showed no change to the status recorded on 21/06/2021 – i.e., that of: "Application awaiting first judicial decision".

I continued to wait for a response from the Court to my most recent letter of 29/09/2021. Ten days after my update to the current page of 27/10/2021, on 06/11/2021, I checked the Court's SOP facility for the latest status of the application. I was surprised to find that a new current state of proceedings was now recorded as: "Application finished", and there appeared a second entry in the list of major events: "Decision to declare a case inadmissible" showing the date "02/09/2021". It appeared therefore that this entry had been added to the database after my publication of the application documents online – in the period between 27/10/2021 and 06/11/2021 – and that the decision had been in effect backdated to appear as if it had been made eight weeks previously on 02/09/2021.6

I telephoned ECtHR on Monday 08/11/2021 to query the timing of this recorded decision, and to verify the Court's receipt of my two letters of 26/08/2021 and 29/09/2021 notifying it of changes to my correspondence address. I was informed during this call that a letter notifying of the decision had been sent from the Court to me "on 09/09/2021" at the address given in my application form (the Interhostel address), and that the Court had "not received" the information regarding my changes of correspondence address. I was advised that if I wished to receive a copy of the decision I should fax that request to the Court. I then sent the fax request to the Court on 09/11/2021, after searching several hours for a fax service.7 During a telephone call to the Court later that day it was confirmed the Court's receipt of the faxed request.

I then waited for a response from the Court at the poste restante address given in my faxed letter (the same address as given in my letter sent by post to the Court on 29/09/2021), and having received no such response at that address by 19/11/2021, I telephoned the Court once more to query whether a response had yet been issued by the Court. On this occasion the call-handler stated that no information could be given by telephone and that any such request for information must be put in writing to the Court. This was inconsistent with the fact that exactly that kind of information had been readily given to me in response to my earlier calls.

I telephoned the Court again on 25/11/2021, giving my reference number and explaining that I had still received no response from the Court to my faxed request of 9 November, and asking for information whether the Court had yet sent a copy of its decision letter in response. The call-handler stated again – inconsistently with the responses to my earlier calls – that she was unable to access the details of the case in order to confirm whether or not any letter had been sent from the Court.

At the time of the current revision to this page – 28 November 2021 – it is 19 days since ECtHR's receipt of my faxed request, and I remain without a response. It is apparent therefore that in not acknowledging or responding appropriately to any of my three letters (the two sent by regular post, and the third sent by fax) the Court is applying a policy of selective opacity with regard to its decision to dismiss my second application, and is to all intents and purposes refusing to communicate the content of that decision or its justification to me.8 The same policy of selective opacity has also been employed by its reception staff in response to my enquiries over correspondence, as on several occasions those staff have freely given the information requested, but with notable inconsistency on the two most recent occasions have refused to give that information.

It is essential that ECtHR should communicate the reasons for its decision to find my second application "inadmissible", and the fact that it has not done so within six months of the purported date of that decision means that those reasons remain opaque. That it should have effectively refused to communicate its reasons suggests that the Court's decision has been made arbitrarily, with disregard to the merits of the application. I am also unaware of the category of decision supposedly made by the Court (whether it is the decision of a single judge, a Committee of 3 judges, or a decision made by a Chamber of 7 judges). I understand however that a decision on inadmissibility is final and unappealable in all three categories. To compare with the timing of the decision in the case of my first application dated 23/02/2021, the inadmissibility of that application was established by the Court (presumably by a single judge) within three weeks of the Court's receipt of the application (it is assumed that the Court received that application around 02/03/2021, while its letter rejecting the application followed dated 18/03/2021). In the case of the second application however, even if we accept the purported date of 02/09/2021 for that decision as 'truthful', it is clear that ECtHR deliberated for more than 14 weeks in arriving at that decision. As that decision did not appear at the SOP database until after 27/10/2021, the effective delay by the Court in notifying of its decision (excluding its reasons) was more than 22 weeks following its receipt of the second application.

From the preceding account of events there inevitably arises the suspicion that the Court has falsely represented the date of its decision to dismiss my second application – that suspicion is reinforced in view of the Court's most recent failure to provide a response to my faxed request for a copy of its decision. In particular, it is not really credible that each of the three letters sent by regular post – my two letters to the Court notifying it of my changes in my correspondence address, plus the Court's decision letter purportedly sent on 09/09/2021 to Kammakargatan 46 in Stockholm – have all been similarly 'lost in the post'. The Court's letter ought to have reached its destination by the 17/09/2021 at the latest, where I would have been able to receive it, as I visited the hostel premises on 23/09/2021, and I also had an arrangement with the staff there to email me with the news of any post arriving in my absence; so that had the letter arrived at any time during September I would have been informed of the fact. The suspicion that the Court has falsely claimed both to have made and communicated its decision to dismiss my second application between 2 and 9 September 2021 is consistent with the observation that no entry in relation to that decision appeared upon the Court's SOP database until after 27/10/2021, following my somewhat controversial publication of the application documents online, together with a link to the SOP facility itself. It is inferred therefore that the Court was wise to the event of that publication and was provoked as a consequence into invoking a decision to dismiss the application, not for the reason of any inherent inadmissibility in the application itself, but essentially because the Court lacked the judicial will to proceed to a fair judgement of that application; i.e., with disregard to its merits.

It is reasonable to conclude from the above that the ECtHR finds that it is simply unable to act according to its mandate in response to my application and has been compelled into a decision of "inadmissibility" while being unable to provide substantive reasons for that decision. The conduct of the Court in applying selective opacity in the case of my application, both with respect to its material correspondence and to its published caselaw (re: footnote 8 below), merely replicates a pattern of behaviour well established by the London county courts during 2019-20 in my efforts to appeal the possession claim, and which formed a substantial part of my allegation against the UK over its violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In this case therefore the ECtHR appears incapable of acting to redress either that violation or the continuing situation of the UK's clear violation of Article 8 § 1, and the Court's failure of judicial will serves to perpetuate both violations. This failure to respond with judicial rigour by an office of the Council of Europe, in the context of these quite egregious domestic European human rights violations, is consistent with that already observed following my approaches to the Council's Commissioner for Human Rights between 2013-2016, as discussed within the later sections of the introductory page to this website.

28 November 2021

Footnotes:

  1. I am uncertain of the precise date, but the role of the landlord's managing agent changed hands from CDS to a company called 'MBM' during the early months of 2015 – I became informed of this change during April 2015. [back]
  2. The main ZIP archive (Miscarriage_of_Justice.zip) contains the series of 39 email statements in the form of a PDF folio (Emails_C4-News_folio.pdf), with their listed attachments as a series of accompanying numbered and dated individual ZIP files. For reasons of confidentiality, certain of the attachments listed in the emails have been excluded from the publication, and there are frequent redactions to some of the included material. This is both for reasons of confidentiality and also because some of the material is simply incorrect and misleading (including sections of my own statements), or otherwise potentially defamatory to myself or to others. I should point out that I have received no considered response to any of my emails from the Channel4 News Team, only its email auto-responses. [back]
  3. Civil Procedure Rules Committee, CPR – Practice Direction 52A – Appeals, Section 3.9 §2(a) – https://www.gov.uk/guidance/civil-procedure-rules-parts-41-to-60/practice-direction-52a-appeals-general-provisions. [back]
  4. However, the files pertaining to the ECtHR applications as originally attached to my email 38 to Channel4 News are excluded from the bulk of the attachments contained in the archive Miscarriage_of_Justice.zip; but are available here in their own dedicated archive: ECtHR_Applications.zip (39MB). [back]
  5. The URL for ECtHR's State of Proceedings online searchable database is: https://app.echr.coe.int/SOP/index.aspx. [back]
  6. My correspondence with ECtHR following its receipt and verbal acknowledgement of my second application, beginning with my letter of 26/08/2021, is contained within a PDF folio comprising 4 items (also included within ECtHR_Applications.zip) – ECtHR_folio.pdf – [PDF folio – 1.95MB]. The third item within this folio is a document showing two pasted screenshots from the ECtHR's online SOP facility – the first representing the state of proceedings as viewed on 27/10/2021; the second that viewed on 06/11/2021. [back]
  7. The faxed letter is item 4 of the folio described in note 6 above. [back]
  8. As a further evidence of this policy, it is not possible to find a reference to either of the decisions relating to my first or second application at the Court's searchable HUDOC database (accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int), which is a transparent repository of all judgements and decisions made by the Court; i.e., including decisions of inadmissibility, and representing even those cases in which the applicants have requested anonymity. It appears therefore that the decisions in response to both my applications have been intentionally sequestered from the HUDOC database. [back]

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